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ABSTRACT
Modelling reasoning with precedents has been a central concern
of AI and Law since its inception. A recent paper has provided a
discussion (in jurisprudential terms) of whether such reasoning is
best seen as rule application or analogy. We review some of the
prominent AI and Law approaches and find that over the years there
has been a move away from analogy to rule application. Even in
those approaches which do use analogy, however, the analogies
handled concern only analogies between cases represented as sets
of factors, and do not consider analogies between the elements of
the fact situations peculiar to particular cases. In actual practice,
however, analogies are used to determine which factors are relevant
in a case, and which party is favoured by particular aspects of the
case situation. Such analogies relate not to factors, but to real-world
elements of the case and are hard to make and critique without a
comprehensive common sense ontology. Thus while we may be able
to construct specific ontologies to model past examples of such ana-
logical reasoning, which can be useful for simulation and teaching,
the ability to perform analogical reasoning on novel situations is,
and is likely to remain, infeasible. This conclusion suggests that
there will always be limits to our ability to construct systems able to
handle new cases presenting novel situations.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing Law.
KEYWORDS
argumentation, analogy, reasoning with cases
ACM Reference Format:
Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon. 2019. Reasoning with Legal Cases:
Analogy or Rule Application?. In Seventeenth International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL ’19), June 17–21, 2019, Montreal,
QC, Canada. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3322640.3326695
1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence has been pursued with a variety of different
motivations. Some researchers pursue “strong” AI in which the goal
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is to build a “person or, more humbly, an animal” [21]. Others pur-
sue “weak” AI, in which the goal is to produce behaviour which, if
done by a human, would be considered intelligent [41]. Still others
are interested in cognitive science, which uses computer models
to explore the mind and its processes. In the latter it is how things
are done, not what is done that is important. Similarly AI and Law
has been pursued with a variety of motivations. Some have indeed
thought that it would become possible to replace judges with ma-
chines [25], although this ambition may be more often attributed
to AI and Law researchers by the press1 than actually pursued by
the researchers themselves. Others have simply preferred to build
applications intended to support lawyers in matters such as concep-
tual retrieval [50]. Others have aimed to produced computer assisted
learning systems [5]. Still others have been interested in modelling
the reasoning processes of lawyers [46].
All these motivations can been seen in AI systems concerned
with reasoning with legal precedents. We have systems intended to
predict the outcomes of new cases (e.g. [20] and [4]); systems to
retrieve relevant cases (e.g. [27]); systems for teaching law students
(e.g.[5]) and systems for modelling the reasoning of lawyers (e.g.
[48]). In pursuing the last of these aims, the question arises as to
whether reasoning with precedents is best seen as the construction
of a theory and the application of the rules of that theory, or as
reasoning by analogy using previously decided cases. This question
was the concern of a recent paper by Katharina Stevens [49], written
from a jurisprudential standpoint, which we will use as the starting
point for this paper.
In this paper we will try to shed light on which of these various
aims appear to be feasibly addressed by AI, especially symbolic AI.
In particular we shall distinguish between the ex post simulation of
legal reasoning in particular cases, useful for both modelling the rea-
soning processes and training law students, and the ex ante reasoning
required to predict the outcomes of cases in which novel situations,
which do not unequivocally match any existing precedents, may
occur. The latter include cases where the rules “run out” [51], and
so precedents often fail to provide sufficient guidance. Similarly
machine learning approaches can only use past cases, and so may be
unable to adapt to novel situations. For novel situations, we suggest
that the use of analogy becomes essential, and in such cases the
analogy is typically required to be not between cases themselves,
but between elements in the factual situations of the cases, and so
draws on common-sense knowledge about the world rather than
purely legal knowledge about case law.
1For example the 2016 Guardian article Artificial intelligence ’judge’ developed by UCL
computer scientists https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/24/artificial-
intelligence-judge-university-college-london-computer-scientists. This article relates to
[4]. The paper itself made rather more modest claims.
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2 REASONINGWITH PRECEDENTS
In a recent paper [49] Stevens explores the question of whether “the
process of reasoning through which a judge determines whether the
existence of a specific precedent gives her a binding authoritative
reason to follow in her present-case” is best seen as rule applica-
tion or analogical reasoning. Stevens identifies the key difference
between the two as follows: rule application approaches
“describe reasoning by precedent as a process in which
a judge first determines a rule from the precedent-
case alone and then applies it to the present-case. She
reasons with each case independently and connects the
two through the rule.” p8, Italics ours.
In contrast, analogical reasoning is a process
“in which a judge reasons with both cases at the same
time, finding similarities and differences between them.”
[49], p8.
Roth [47] makes a similar distinction. His thesis, however, com-
pares cases as sets of factors, and does not consider analogies leading
to the ascription of factors.
The strength of the rule application approach is that it provides a
good mechanism to show how precedents constrain decisions. The
weakness is that it does not provide an effective way of distinguishing
cases: distinguished cases would be covered by a more specific rule,
but there is no mechanism to propose exceptions when no more
specific rule exists. Analogical reasoning is the reverse since it does
consider the differences between the cases and so easily accounts for
distinguishing, but offers a less satisfactory account of precedential
constraint. In practice the distinction may become blurred: Stevens
suggests
“that both approaches are viable in principle because
they can be amended to meet the objections. Once
amended, both approaches can accommodate the prac-
tice of distinguishing and account for the constraining
effects of precedents.” p2.
In the light of this distinction between analogy and rule applica-
tion, we will begin by considering some leading previous approaches
to reasoning with cases in AI and Law, to see the extent to which
they can be seen as using analogical reasoning.
3 REASONINGWITH PRECEDENT IN AI
AND LAW
Reasoning with precedents has been a central topic of AI and Law
from the beginning. An overview of the development since 1987 (the
year of the first ICAIL) can be found in [14]. A highly influential
early approach, upon which subsequent approaches draw heavily,
was Rissland and Ashley’s HYPO, introduced in [46] and most
fully described in [7]. Our consideration of the development of
reasoning with precedents in AI and Law will show a movement
from analogical reasoning to rule application.
• HYPO [7]. This uses analogical reasoning, because the cur-
rent case plays a central role. For each new case, a case
lattice is created, rooted in the current case, and with its chil-
dren comprising cases sharing aspects2 with the current case.
2We follow Stevens in using aspects to refer to legally relevant features of the cases.
These include both the dimensions of HYPO and the factors of CATO and subsequent
Those with the desired outcome may be cited, those with the
opposite outcome can be used as counter-examples. HYPO
is also concerned with distinguishing cases: distinguishing
and counter-examples are how the cited precedents may be
challenged.
• CATO [5]. This was a development from HYPO and can also
be considered to use analogy. It too starts with a case lattice,
and places even more emphasis on distinguishing since its
main purpose is to assist law students in recognising which
differences between the current case and the precedent repre-
sent effective distinctions. To this end it organises factors into
a hierarchy to allow for the downplaying of poor distinctions
and the emphasis of good ones.
• Partitioning approaches [11] and [52]. These approaches also
begin with the current case and a precedent. They partition
the aspects present in these two cases into: plaintiff aspects
in common, defendant aspects in common, aspects which
make the current case weaker and aspects which make the
precedent case stronger. In [52] the partitions are then used
to instantiate a set of argument schemes, intended to support
CATO-style reasoning. Again there is an attempt to identify
the differences between the cases and the legal significance
of these differences.
• Rewriting as sets of rules [40]. Prakken and Sartor’s paper
represented a significant turning point in the treatment of rea-
soning with cases, as it showed how the knowledge embodied
in precedents could be expressed as a set of rules. Each prece-
dent is represented as three rules. Two are defeasible: the first
is that there should prima facie be a decision for the plaintiff
if all the pro-plaintiff aspects in the precedent are present in
the new case; the second is that there should prima facie be
a decision for the defendant if all the pro-defendant aspects
in the precedent are present in the new case. The third ex-
presses a priority between these rules, depending on which
party won the precedent case. This approach produces a the-
ory, constructed solely on the basis of the precedents, without
reference to the current case, and so very much represents
rule application.
• Theory construction [17]. One problem with the preceding
approach is that strictly it can only justify a fortiori reasoning,
whereas in practice new cases will present new combinations
of aspects, for which no priority rules exist. This limits the
usefulness of the theory: it cannot resolve conflicts between
rules which have not previously been decided. In [17] an at-
tempt to remedy this was made by associating aspects with
the promotion of particular social values, and using prece-
dents to establish preferences between values which could
then be used to determine as yet untested combinations of
aspects, provided they relate to the same values as featured in
the precedents. This approach makes no intrinsic use of the
current case, but an empirical realisation of the approach [23]
constrained the proposed theories by the need to provide the
systems. As such they may be Boolean (like factors) or have magnitude (like dimensions).
They may (like factors) or may not (like dimensions) intrinsically favour a particular
party to the case. Moreover they may be derived from facts, as in HYPO, or the cases
may be represented as sets of aspects, as in CATO and most subsequent approaches.
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desired outcome in the current case. Even so, this implemen-
tation was interested in similarities rather than differences,
and so cannot be considered analogical in Stevens’ sense.
• Formalisations of precedential constraint [31] and [42]. These
papers build on the rule based rewriting of [40]. In [31] the
problem of a fortiori is addressed by allowing the rule for the
winning side to be broadened so that it contains only a subset
of the aspects available in the precedent. The claim is that this
represents the reason model of precedential constraint [35] as
opposed to the results model [6], which was essentially what
was used in [40]. Some refinements are presented in [42].
• Methodology based on Abstract Dialectical Frameworks [3].
The ANGELIC methodology presented in [3] is very firmly
in the rule application camp. It sets out to encapsulate the
knowledge enshrined in a set of cases in a legal domain, for
application to new cases. Thus the theory is produced before
any new case has arisen, and so there is no possibility of
analogical reasoning.
Although these approaches can be seen as developments in a
common tradition [14], there is a movement from what Stevens
would term an analogical approach, tailored to the current case,
to a rule based approach. In the earlier systems the current case
was prominent and individual precedents and their differences and
distinguishing were at centre stage. By the later systems, however,
the theory was formed from the precedents before the new case arose
and the nature of precedential constraint and the encapsulation of
the knowledge represented by the whole set of precedents and of the
priorities between them became central.
Stevens herself favours analogy, believing
“that integrating analogical mapping into reasoning by
precedent brings with it important advantages that are
lost in reasoning according to the pure rule approach.
Specifically, analogical mapping has the benefit of
guiding the attention of the judge to the most plausible
ways in which she can understand the precedent so
that it applies to the present-case.” p39.
According to Stevens there are two advantages to analogy:
“Arguments by analogy are used not only because
of their justificatory power, but also because of their
rhetorical strength. Analogies are rhetorically effective
because they encourage those who are trying to under-
stand them to restructure their understanding of the
analogs in a way that makes them appear more simi-
lar. ... The rule based approach only allows difference
in terms drawn from a pre-identified list of factors,
whereas in analogy, anything may serve as a relevant
difference.” p34, (italics ours)
Should we therefore consider reviving some of the earlier ideas,
returning the current case to centre stage, especially if we want to
be able to deal with cases which are not straightforwardly decidable
from the current precedents?
4 COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES
Stevens argues that both approaches are viable, once they have
been modified to meet the basic objections (the inability of analogy
to capture the notion of precedential constraint and the inability
of rules to adequately account for distinguishing). She expresses
these modified versions in the form of argumentation schemes and
possible attacks on such arguments in the form of questions. For the
rule based scheme the questions given in [49], p14. are:
R1 Is the best interpretation of the opinion of precedent-case A
that it provides rule a?
R2 Is the legal syllogism of the form modus ponens that uses
rule a in the major premise and case B in the minor premise
deductively valid?
R3 Is there any reason that defeats the presumption for reaching
decision Y based on a property of the present-case B that the
precedent-case A did not have?
R4 Does case B have properties n1, n2? [i.e. is the antecedent of
rule a satisfied?].
For analogy the questions are ([49], p32):
A1 Are A and B similar in a legally relevant way?
A2 Can a successful mapping be made to an aspect of the present-
case for every aspect of the precedent-case that the opinion
highlights enough to indicate that it is part of the ratio in the
opinion?
A3 Does the surrounding law allow present-case and precedent-
case to be mapped successfully?
A4 Are there no legally relevant differences between A and B?
Note that, unlike R3 and R4 it makes no difference which
case has the additional aspect.
Notable (from a computational point of view) is that the questions
relating to rule application are very much more precise than those
relating to analogy. For rule application (modelled as in [31]):
• R4 simply checks that all the antecedents of the rule are
present in the case, so that the rule is applicable.
• R2 checks that the rule has been correctly applied.
• R3 checks that there is no applicable rule (exception) with
the opposite outcome, and with a higher priority.
• R1 relates to the fact that the reason model as expressed in
[31] uses a subset of the aspects from the precedent, and so
raises the possibility that there may be a more suitable subset.
Thus R2, R3 and R4 are simply a matter of whether the rule has
been properly applied. R1 does, however, give some scope for a
substantial challenge. Since several subsets of the winning aspects
in the precedent could have been chosen as the rule, it is possible to
argue that a different subset should have been chosen. If this is so,
and the present-case may lack the aspects required to satisfy the new
rule, the argument fails.
The questions for analogy are less straightforward to conceive in
computational terms. A4 may well be what is addressed by empha-
sising and downplaying distinctions in CATO, with legal relevance
being captured by the notion of downplaying distinctions. A1 can
be answered affirmatively if there are aspects in common between
the present case and the precedent, and the precedent cannot be
distinguished or trumped by a counterexample. A2 could be seen
as checking that the required aspects were present in both cases.
A3, however, seems to go beyond and suggest that there may be
factors which require consideration, but which cannot be found in
the existing set of precedents. This suggests that analogy may be
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essential when we are confronted with a novel case, with relevant
aspects not found in any of the previous cases. We will explore this
further in the following sections.
5 ANALOGY IS REQUIRED IN
“HARD CASES”
A difficulty with the rule model, not discussed by Stevens, but recog-
nised very early in AI and Law [51], is that the rules will run out,
and the new case may well fall under two conflicting rules, or under
no rule at all. Such cases were termed hard cases in [51].
Conflicts can possibly be resolved using priorities as in [40] or
value preferences as in [17], or prevented from arising through the
precedential constraint mechanism of [31]. The possibility of gaps,
however, is harder to avoid. If one only allows precedents to apply to
cases which are at least as strong (as in [40] or the results model of
[31]), gaps will inevitably be frequent. It is important that rules are
capable of going beyond a fortiori reasoning from the precedents if
they are to provide guidance for a reasonable number of cases. This
was the role of values in [17]3, and was the motivation for adopting
the reasons model by using only a subset of the aspects favouring the
winning side in [31]. Even so, cases will arise which are not covered
by any of the established value preferences, or any of the rules, even
if they are broadened as suggested in [31].
The problem is exacerbated if we consider that some aspects can
have magnitude, as discussed in [29], [43], [16] and [30]. If we
adopt these approaches, we need to determine, for all such aspects, a
“switching point”4 at which the aspect ceases to favour the plaintiff
and begins to favour the defendant. Although the switching point
is constrained by precedents setting upper and lower bounds, a new
case will often fall into the gap between them so that it can be argued
by both sides that it is favourable to them (or to neither). If there are
several aspects of the new case which have gaps, the case becomes
even harder. To resolve such cases, rules cannot help us: we must
resort to some kind of analogical reasoning. Note that the gap here
is not simply because we have no applicable rule given the set of
factors, but that we are even not able to determine which factors are
present.
The idea is now to collect those precedents relevant to the new
cases (cf the “near misses” of [48]). If the new case falls into a gap
these will be the closest precedents, that is those supplying the cur-
rent upper and lower bounds, and one will favour the plaintiff and the
other the defendant. Analogy will then be used to determine which
of the bounds the case under consideration should be considered
more similar to. Where several aspects with magnitude are involved,
there may be several such pairs of precedents, each requiring the
determination of a switching point, or of a trade off equation as in
[16]. For Boolean aspects, the closest precedents can be determined
by looking for analogies to the relevant elements in the current case.
Note that, as we shall discuss in more detail below, the analogy
in such cases is not between sets of factors, but between factual
constituents of the cases, which decide whether particular factors
are present or absent in the case or, for aspects with magnitude and
3The idea in [17] was that, since several factors can promote the same value, a value pref-
erence established by a precedent could also be applied to cases where that preference
was instantiated by different factors relating to those same values.
4Following [43], we use “point”, although often there may be an interval in which
neither side is favoured by the aspect.
dimensions, which party is favoured in the case. We may therefore
distinguish different ways in which a case may be “hard”.
• It may be that the aspects present in the case do not allow
the application of any rule derivable from the precedents. In
such a case a new preference between the sets of plaintiff and
defendant aspects must be determined [39]. Here any analogy
can be considered as being between cases represented as sets
of aspects, in the manner of [7] and [5].
• It may be that we have an aspect with magnitude which in the
case occupies a part of the range not yet determined as being
pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. Here we need to determine
which side of the switching point the aspect occupies in this
case, and this may involve the use of analogy to determine
the most similar precedent. Such analogies will be in terms
of the relevant fact situations.
• It may be that we are unsure as to whether an aspect is present
or absent. In Dillon v Legg, discussed in the next section, the
aspect is close relationship but it is debatable whether there
is a close relationship or not. Again we need to consider
analogies between the elements present in the fact situations
of the current and precedent cases.
Thus only some hard cases turn on case comparisons at the aspect
level. The last two of the above bullets turn on analogies between
real-world elements of the cases. There the precedents supply points
of reference to be used in the analogy, but no guidance as to whether
or not the analogy should be accepted: that is left for the judge to
decide (and judges are permitted to disagree, which is often the
source of minority opinions). Thus encoding as rules in advance of
the decisions is not possible in these situations.
6 ANALOGY AND THE ASCRIPTION OF
ASPECTS
One feature common to all the above AI approaches is that a case is
seen as capable of being represented as a set of aspects. Although
HYPO does compute the dimensions on the basis of facts (in a
determinate way, so that there is no room for arguments as to which
dimensions apply to a given set of facts), the precedential reasoning
only begins when the case lattice is formed on the basis of the
applicable dimensions. The other approaches unashamedly represent
cases as sets of factors. But this avoids a great deal of interpretation.
As Stevens says
“The difficulties in interpreting opinions have been
discussed often and at length. Duxbury in [26], at ch.
3, gives an overview over all the problems with inter-
preting opinions and describes in detail the discussion
about the determination of the ratio decidendi that
took place in the 1930s to 1960s. ... In Horty’s, Bench-
Capon’s, and Rigoni’s approaches, these difficulties
are bracketed by the authors, who begin their theoriz-
ing only after the aspects of the case are categorized
and determined as belonging to the rule’s antecedent or
the list of defeated reasons.” p16, footnote 46, (italics
ours)
This criticism, that the crucial decision of which aspects to as-
cribe to the cases is taken out of consideration by the system, applies
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equally to the other AI and Law approaches as well as those specif-
ically mentioned by Stevens. Once we have identified the set of
aspects applicable to the cases, the analogy is between the cases,
considered only as these sets of aspects. But examination of actual
examples in legal opinions suggests that analogy is often intended
to establish the similarity between two elements of the fact situation,
so that the appropriate aspects can be identified.
Steven’s main example for discussing analogy is Dillon v Legg5
which was a case decided by the Supreme Court of California that
established the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. It
was held that a bystander who suffers damages by the conduct of a
negligent tortfeasor can recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The reasoning, expressed in Tobriner’s majority opinion,
was
“ Instead of applying a strict rule, courts should con-
sider factors such as whether the plaintiff was near the
scene of the accident, how closely the plaintiff was
related to the victim, and what caused the emotional
distress.”
Thus we cannot apply the rule until we have identified the set of
aspects, such as whether the claimant was sufficiently closely related
to the victim, that are applicable to the case. Stevens writes:
“Imagine, for example, that I was to claim that Dil-
lon v. Legg should be followed if an accident was not
witnessed by the mother of the victim, but instead a
kindergarten teacher. I might justify this by saying
‘kindergarten teachers are like mothers.’ In this ex-
ample, ‘kindergarten teachers’ is the target [of the
analogy] while ‘mothers’ is the source.” p21.
The issue concerned is whether the plaintiff is sufficiently closely
related to the victim, and the analogy is used to determine whether
this is so or not, and so whether the aspect is present in the case.
This in turn will determine whether the rule should be applied.
At first sight a kindergarten teacher does not seem to be covered
by the decision which speaks of the plaintiff being “closely related”
to the victim, since we might understand relation as blood relation
and so see the kindergarten teacher as not related at all. But Stevens
offers grounds for an analogy on the basis that both mothers and
kindergarten teachers love their charges because they have taken
care of them. Quite possibly the analogy will be rejected because
kindergarten teachers tend to have more wards, and because the care
provided is less intimate, so that there are significant differences
sufficient to defeat the analogy. But the analogy may be more per-
suasive in the case of a wet nurse who has subsequently brought up
the child as the main carer, as in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet,
where the nurse seems to be more attached to Juliet than her actual
mother.
The point of the analogy is to attempt to broaden an interpretation
based on close (perhaps even, blood) relationship, which might
be felt not to favour anyone except parents, and to include other
(non-blood) relationships, based on more specific details of the
particular relationship between plaintiff and victim. Once it has
5Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968). The case concerned a mother who, with her
daughter, witnessed the death of her other child in a car accident and sued the driver for
damages on the grounds of emotional distress. The lower court had rejected her claim
because she herself was not in physical danger, but the appeal overturned that decision.
been decided that the relationship is sufficiently close, the cases
become identical at the factor level: if it is not sufficiently close, the
cases are similar but significantly different. Here, importantly, the
analogical argument is not about similarity of the cases, but about
similarity of their protagonists. Once this had been decided, factors
can be assigned and the similarity or otherwise of the cases can be
straightforwardly resolved.
7 ANALOGY IN A FOURTH AMENDMENT
CASE
Much discussed in AI and Law are cases concerning the automobile
exception to the US 4th Amendment ([44], [9], [13], [3]). The 4th
Amendment prohibits searches without a warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. One such exception is for automobiles (initially estab-
lished in Carroll v United States6, and developed through a series
of cases [13]), on the grounds that obtaining a warrant may not be
possible because of the mobility of the automobile, and because auto-
mobiles have a diminished expectation of privacy, since they may be
routinely stopped and examined. The case of California v Carney7
concerned a motor home8 which was being used to peddle marijuana
while in a San Diego car park. The vehicle was searched without a
warrant and marijuana was found in the rear (living) compartment
of the motor home. Did the lowered expectations of privacy apply?
A number of possible analogies presented themselves: it could be
treated as a normal automobile since it was in a public short stay car
park, and so being used as an automobile; it could be treated as a
dwelling since it was designed for such use and contained a bed and
a refrigerator; it could be considered akin to luggage, since it was a
container of personal effects; or the rear section could be considered
as akin to a glove compartment since it was an integral part of the
vehicle not normally in plain sight.
In his dissent Mr Justice Stevens seemed to like the analogy with
a dwelling:
“When a motor home is parked in a location that is
removed from the public highway, I believe that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize that the expectations of
privacy within it are not unlike the expectations one
has in a fixed dwelling.”
and further Mr Justice Stevens seemed to think that an analogy with
luggage might also be acceptable.
“The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the ar-
gument that the warrantless search was ‘reasonable’
because a footlocker has some of the mobile character-
istics that support warrantless searches of automobiles.
The Court recognized that ‘a person’s expectations of
privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater
than in an automobile,’ [433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 13], and
noted that the practical problems associated with the
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the
period of time necessary to obtain a warrant are signif-
icantly less than those associated with the detention of
an automobile. Id. at 433 U. S. 13, n.7. .. It is perfectly
6Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
7California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985),
8Specifically a Dodge Mini Motor Home, one of the smaller and more basic examples
of the class, resembling a van, rather than an opulent example such as a Winebago.
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obvious that the citizen has a much greater expectation
of privacy concerning the interior of a mobile home9
than of a piece of luggage such as a footlocker.‘’
He does, however, note the difference in that the luggage may be
separately detained, which probably explains why he preferred to
rely on the dwelling analogy.
The majority seemed to find the analogy with enclosed parts of an
automobile more persuasive. In the majority opinion Chief Justice
Burger wrote:
“But even when enclosed ‘repository’ areas have been
involved, we have concluded that the lesser expec-
tations of privacy warrant application of the excep-
tion. We have applied the exception in the context of a
locked car trunk, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, a sealed
package in a car trunk, Ross, supra, a closed com-
partment under the dashboard, Chambers v. Maroney,
supra, the interior of a vehicle’s upholstery, Carroll,
supra, or sealed packages inside a covered pickup
truck, United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985) ...
These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from
the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view,
but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable
of traveling on the public highways.”
The analogy with dwelling is rejected by Burger because
“the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer
would conclude that it was being used not as a res-
idence, but as a vehicle. ... To distinguish between
respondent’s motor home and an ordinary sedan for
purposes of the vehicle exception would require that
we apply the exception depending upon the size of the
vehicle and the quality of its appointments”
This is effectively a refusal to see the relevant aspect as a dimension
running from a small car to a permanent dwelling, but as a pair of
Booleans: vehicle or not vehicle and dwelling or not dwelling, with
the key issue being the actual use of the vehicle at the time of the
search. The refusal to see it as a range is justified by the treatment of
luggage in previous decisions:
“we declined to distinguish between ‘worthy’ and ‘un-
worthy’ containers, noting that ‘the central purpose of
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction.’
We decline today to distinguish between ‘worthy’ and
‘unworthy’ vehicles ” (Burger).
Thus the motor home is considered by the majority to be analo-
gous to a vehicle when parked in a downtown car park, and the rear
compartment to a glove box or a boot (trunk in US). New aspects
which will need to be considered in future cases are identified: the
use to which the vehicle is being put, with location being an impor-
tant test [1]: had the motor home been parked in a trailer park there
may well have been a good case to treat it as a dwelling.
9Note the misleading (conscious or unconscious) use of “mobile”, rather than “motor”,
home. The Wikipedia definition of the former is “a prefabricated structure, built in a
factory on a permanently attached chassis before being transported to site (either by
being towed or on a trailer)”, while the latter is “a type of self-propelled recreational
vehicle (RV) which offers living accommodation combined with a vehicle engine.”
“Motor home” was (correctly) used in the syllabus.
8 ROLES FOR ANALOGY
The use of analogy in Dillon is rather different from the use of
analogy in Carney. Taken together the cases show that there are
several different ways in which analogy can be used.
The new case may fall into a gap on a single aspect. Dillon v Legg
can be in seen this way, with the relevant aspect “close relation”.
We may have precedents with a mother considered sufficiently close
and a cousin not so considered. If a new case with a kindergarten
teacher arises we may see the relationship as closer than a cousin
(because love arises from caring) or more distant (because not a
blood relationship). It may be held that the relationship is closer
than a cousin, but not sufficiently close to a mother, because of the
differences (more children, temporary relation, less intimate care).
But if a further case with Juliet’s wet nurse arises, these differences
do not apply and the analogy with mother may be accepted. This
reasoning can be seen as determining the switching point on an
aspect with magnitude.
Alternatively we may need first to choose between several possi-
bilities for determining the aspects relevant in the case. In Carney
we can see the relevant aspect as function (vehicle/dwelling) or con-
tainer (luggage/glove box). Both the majority and the minority went
for the first option, and the decision turned on the current use (as a
vehicle) as against the potential use (as a dwelling). The majority
held that the current use prevailed and introduced a new aspect (lo-
cation) to serve as a test for current use. In Carney the first decision
was on which aspect the analogy will be sought, and the decision
was on the use of the vehicle.
Analogy can also be used in deciding on the nature of the aspect,
whether Boolean or with magnitude. The majority decided, using an
analogy with luggage, that this was not to be considered as a range,
running from standard automobile through to standard dwelling,
but as a pair of Booleans, in-use-as-vehicle and in-use-as-dwelling.
Location is then used as a test to decide which applies: being on the
highway or in a car park implies in-use-as-vehicle while being in
a trailer park may imply in-use-as-dwelling. This clarifies that the
nature of the aspects vehicle and dwelling and relates them to the
third aspect, location.
Further, it might be that we need to consider two aspects in the
analogy: in Dillon, Tobriner mentions the cause of the emotional
distress as well as the closeness of the relationship. It may be that
different causes would affect how we viewed the closeness of dif-
ferent relationships. This is akin to the trade offs of [16] where it is
also argued that there would never be a need to consider more than
two aspects simultaneously.
These points bring us back very close to the position of [51], in
which Gardner distinguished between “easy cases” which could be
solved by rule application and “hard cases” which required more
sophisticated reasoning. Similarly [48] argues that at the top level of
the argument tree rules can be used, but in order to determine whether
the predicates in the antecedents of these rules apply, some kind of
HYPO style case based reasoning is needed. Also in IBP [20] the top
level comprises rules which identify issues, which are then resolved
using CATO style case based reasoning. Both HYPO and CATO use
analogical reasoning, albeit only in terms of aspects, not of elements
of the cases. In neither [48] and [20], however, do the rules come
from precedents. Instead they use statutes and commentaries. This
Reasoning with Legal Cases: Analogy or Rule Application? ICAIL ’19, June 17–21, 2019, Montreal, QC, Canada
limits the extent of the rule based reasoning in those approaches, but
in the approach that has emerged from this paper, rules derived from
precedents can take us much further down the tree, and are sufficient
to fully resolve many cases in the manner of [31]. We still, however,
need analogical reasoning in certain circumstances where we have
a novel situation which the current judges have to resolve. In our
discussion above we found three such situations:
• when we are trying to justify a switching point (as in Dillon);
• when we have to choose which aspects are relevant in a case
(as in Carney); or
• when we must determine whether an aspect is Boolean or has
magnitude (also in Carney).
Answering these questions will, however, require something more
than HYPO or CATO offer: in both those approaches the starting
point for reasoning with cases is a set of aspects, but as we have
seen, we may need reasoning with analogy to determine which are
the applicable aspects, or even the very nature of these aspects.
This need to recognise an inherent limitation in starting from a
representation of cases as bundles of factors (or dimensions), which
has been prevalent in AI and Law for more than 20 years, from [5]
to [43], and including all the approaches outlined in section 2, is
why we need to take analogy seriously. The need arises especially
when the analogies are between particular real-world elements of
the case and drawing attention to this possibility is one of the main
motivations for the discussion in this paper.
9 PROSPECTS FOR COMPUTATIONAL
MODELS OF ANALOGY
The question now arises as to whether it is feasible to attempt to
provide computational support for analogical reasoning in cases
presenting novel situations. Since we have moved beyond the narrow
confines of law into the real world, we would need a representation of
real world concepts such as vehicles and dwellings (Carney), moth-
ers and teachers (Dillon) and baseballs and foxes (Popov v Hayashi,
which involved a baseball, but in which analogies were drawn with
Pierson v Post, which concerned a fox [10]). This suggests that at the
heart of such support would be an ontology, which would provide
the various properties of such objects which could then be mapped to
produce the analogies. Such an ontology would need to be highly so-
phisticated: a lightweight ontology such as Wordnet [38] would not
be enough, since we need to have a reasonably comprehensive list of
the attributes of our objects. Moreover such an ontology would need
to deal with open texture, whereas ontologies currently typically rely
on definition by necessary and sufficient conditions.
In [8] Kevin Ashley discussed the requirements for an ontology
which would be able to support such analogical reasoning, as well as
teleological and hypothetical reasoning. Ashley’s focus was on the
Socratic dialogues common in US Law Schools, and what would be
needed to support such discussions. His running example, explored
in detail, is the wild animals cases beginning with Pierson v Post
introduced to AI and Law in [18]. Ashley distinguishes between
case-based comparisons and analogies. This is quite similar to the
distinction that emerged above between analogies between cases
represented as sets of factors, and analogies relating to the real-world
elements of the case. Ashley claims that the former “is nearly within
reach of current AI and Law technology”. In the decade since [8]
was written this claim has become even more tenable. For cases
seen as collections of Boolean factors (either present in or absent
from a case), there is now an excellent understanding of how to
compare and reason with cases, as summarised in [14]. The ontology
required for this kind of reasoning can describe cases represented
using factors rather than the real-world domain. Such a case related
ontology can be found in [53]. To facilitate case comparison, an
ontology which describes cases represented as sets of factors might
well be sufficient. For example:
CASE:
Plaintiff: #person
Defendant: #person
PlaintiffFactors: List of #factor
DefendantFactors: List of #factor
Outcome: {plaintiff,defendant}
might well be enough to enable the kind of analogies drawn in [7],
[5] and [52] but is entirely inadequate for the analogies discussed in
sections 4 and 5 above. To support such analogies, Ashley remarked
would “necessitate significant advances in the design of ontologies
and the kinds of reasoning they support”.
But producing such an ontology would be a colossal task, even if
these advances in design had been achieved. Ashley’s proposal
“is to design an ontology incrementally. The exam-
ples can be made incrementally more complex; as new
features are built into the ontology, more advanced be-
havior can be simulated, tested, and accommodated.”
This approach was explored in [1] in which a representation of
the Supreme Court oral hearings is used to update an ontology for
the relevant domain. In this way an ontology built on the basis of
previous cases can be extended with the issues, factors and facts
arising from a new case (Carney is used as the example in [1]).
An incremental approach can work for certain applications. The
task in [1] did not involve analogical reasoning, but used oral hearing
dialogues employing such reasoning to modify and extend an exist-
ing ontology to cover the case under consideration. Similarly Ash-
ley’s envisaged application is to support teaching analogy through
Socratic dialogue in a law school. When preparing a course the
teacher will select cases, and if she wishes to add new cases, is able
to incrementally extend the ontology to cover the new cases. As the
course develops over a number of years, an extensive and useful
ontology may be developed, able to find and critique analogies for
that limited set of cases. But if we wish to support the finding and cri-
tique of analogies in new cases with novel situations, this approach
cannot work: such cases lead to the modification of the ontology,
and so their arguments cannot be found in the existing ontology. An
incrementally built ontology will inescapably be tailored to a partial
set of cases in a particular domain.
In order to handle novel situations, we would need to have a
comprehensive ontology already available from which to produce
the analogies. In [15] Thorne McCarty gives a commentary on [8]
expressing doubt that it would be worthwhile to build such an on-
tology: understanding what it would comprise is enough, and for
practical use it would not repay the necessary investment. This is
obviously true if the intended use of the ontology is to support a
particular application. But what of a general purpose ontology in-
tended to provide a comprehensive ontology and knowledge base
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that would cover all the basic concepts and "rules of thumb" about
how the world works? This would be intended to capture the “com-
mon sense” knowledge that people are able to bring to bear when, for
example, forming and critiquing analogies in novel legal cases. The
(enormous) cost of such a project might be justified by the ability
to deploy such an ontology in many, many, applications (not only
in law, but in every domain). It was just such an ontology that was
proposed by Lenat in his CYC project which was begun in 1984 as
a ten year project [37], [36]. The project has continued since 1995
under the auspices of CYCORP10. Although some successes have
been reported11, it has not proven to be a panacea for all knowledge
base needs. It has not, to our knowledge, been tried in the context of
law.
There are a number of problems with CYC which may have led
to its lack of widespread use. One is the problem of completeness.
No matter how large CYC becomes, it is hard to imagine that it will
have everything required for every application. One of the first major
uses of CYC was in the DARPA high-performance knowledge bases
project [24]. Even at that time CYC was impressively large:
“The CYC knowledge base represents millions of
hand-crafted axioms entered during the 13 years since
CYC’s inception. Through careful policing and gen-
eralizing, there are now slightly fewer than 1 million
axioms in the knowledge base, interrelating roughly
50,000 atomic terms. ... Most embody general con-
sensus information about the concepts. For example,
one axiom says one cannot perform volitional actions
while one sleeps, another says one cannot be in two
places at once, and another says you must be at the
same place as a tool to use it. The knowledge base
spans human capabilities and limitations, including
information on emotions, beliefs, expectations, dreads,
and goals; common everyday objects, processes, and
situations; and the physical universe, including such
phenomena as time, space, causality, and motion.” [24]
None the less, CYC was not adequate to fulfill the tasks asked of
it by the project, and required considerable extension to meet the
specific tasks12 on the project. In [24] we read:
“Answering the challenge problem questions takes a
great deal of knowledge. For the first year’s challenge
problem alone, the Cycorp and Teknowledge team
added some 8,000 concepts and 80,000 assertions”13
This might be seen as a practical problem, and that eventually
CYC will be capable of use without additions. Another practical
problem, however, concerns maintenance: concepts change over
time. But there are some theoretical objections as well.
10https://www.cyc.com/
11http://www.cyc.com/enterprise-solutions/success-stories/
12The project involved several “challenge problems” including crisis man-
agement and battlespace integration. For readers whose own ontology does
not include battlespace, it is defined in the Military Jargon Database
(http://www.jargondatabase.com/Category/Military/Strategy-Jargon/Battle-Space) as
“The combined field of combat. For instance, an invasion of a coastal area would have a
sea component (used by the Navy), a shore component (Marines), inland area (Airborne
troops perhaps) and the area above it all (Air Force). The concept of the battle space is
having a unified plan for all of these actors.”
13Even the additional fragment is larger than any legal ontology yet constructed in AI
and Law.
Firstly most successful ontologies have been constructed for a
particular task [32]. Moreover, an ontology will often be subjective:
there may be several ways of representing a group of concepts, none
of which can be said to be right or wrong, even for a particular task.
As [12] puts it:
“The ontology represents a conceptualisation. Differ-
ent people will conceptualise a domain differently ac-
cording to experience, temperament and their tasks
in the domain. We should therefore not expect that
there is a single ontology applicable to a domain: the
point of the ontology is often to make differences in
conceptualisations visible.”
This last point is particularly pertinent to the ontologies in Carney,
as discussed above. The points at dispute include:
• whether a motor home has the expectations of privacy appro-
priate to a vehicle or a dwelling;
• whether different vehicles have different expectations of pri-
vacy, or these expectations are equally lowered for all vehicles
irrespective of their type;
• whether it is the current or potential use that determines the
nature of an object (here whether the motor home is a vehicle
or a dwelling).
The questions could be answered by reference to an ontology, but
that would mean that we were obliged to follow the conceptualisa-
tion embodied in that particular ontology, whereas the case in fact
turned on the difference in the conceptualisations of plaintiff and
defendant. This is quite explicit in [1], in which different structures
are created to represent the conceptulisations of the plaintiff, the
defendant and the justices. The last of these reflects the accepted
arguments, and can be seen as containing the extensions to an exist-
ing ontology required to accommodate the new case. This fits well
with the idea in [8], which suggests that ontologies be constructed
incrementally. The situation in cases such as Carney appears to be
that there are competing ontologies, and the justices choose between
the alternatives. In consequence, the “correct” ontology can only
be determined after the decision. This would make any attempt to
construct an ontology capable of dealing with as yet unknown novel
cases futile: what such an ontology should contain cannot be known
in advance of the case being heard, since it turns on what the ma-
jority of the judges find most plausible, when actually confronted
with a particular novel case, and the accompanying arguments. The
essence of open textured concepts is that decisions are made as the
need arises and there is no pre-existing “truth of the matter”.
9.1 Big Data and Machine Learning
These limitations of symbolic systems for predicting legal cases,
together with the much increased availability of large amounts of
data, have led to a growth of interest in systems using machine
learning techniques to predict the outcomes of cases. Large quantities
of data do exist: [33] drew on an extensive database of Supreme
Court Decisions. As reported on the website of Science journal14 it
“used the Supreme Court Database, which contains in-
formation on cases dating back to 1791, ... They drew
14https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/artificial-intelligence-prevails-
predicting-supreme-court-decisions
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on 16 features of each vote, including the justice, the
term, the issue, and the court of origin. Researchers
also added other factors, such as whether oral argu-
ments were heard ... From 1816 until 2015, the algo-
rithm correctly predicted 70.2% of the court’s 28,000
decisions and 71.9% of the justices’ 240,000 votes”.
Another study [22] draws on digitisations of “80,000 cases and a
million judge votes from 1891 in the Circuit Courts”. These projects
were not chiefly concerned with predicting case outcomes, but an-
other project which was designed for prediction and which attracted
a great deal of attention was reported in [4]. It was designed to
predict violations of the European Convention on Human Rights
and used 584 cases. That project reported a success rate of 79%.
Although these techniques undoubtedly have their uses (e.g. [22] is
concerned with identifying examples of, presumably unconscious,
bias in its collection of decisions), there are some doubts concerning
their application to systems intended to predict new cases.
• Success rate. Typically these systems report a success rate of
between 70 and 80%. While this can be seen as successful
in that it does significantly improve on the baselines, it does
not really represent an acceptable level of performance for
use in real courts passing sentences on real people. Symbolic
approaches using hand-crafted rules typically report an ability
to deal with over 90% of cases (e.g. [20] and [2]). This seems
reasonable, given that far fewer than 10% cases introduce the
kind of challenging novel situations which we saw as giving
difficulties for symbolic approaches, so it is not clear that the
machine learning approaches represent an improvement in
terms of prediction.
• Transparency and Explanation. A major strength of the sym-
bolic approaches is that they present their reasoning as argu-
ments which can be assessed and critiqued. In law, an answer
is never enough: it is the reasons for that answer which are
needed [45]. The explanation of the predictions in machine
learning systems is often not satisfactory. For example [4]
offered “the 20 most frequent words, listed in order of their
SVM weight”. These lists do not, however, look immediately
promising: the list for topic 23 of article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights predicting violation, for exam-
ple, is:
court, applicant, article, judgment, case, law, proceed-
ing, application, government, convention, time, article
convention, January, human, lodged, domestic, February,
September, relevant, represented
One doubts whether this would be the list expected by a legal
expert.
• Will the future resemble the past? In science we generally as-
sume that this is so. But in law we can have far less confidence.
One of the strengths of the Common Law is its ability to adapt
to new situations and changing social attitudes. Precedents
themselves may be subject to reinterpretation in the light
of subsequent decisions. Law changes [19], sometimes sud-
denly as a result of new legislation or a landmark decision,
but sometimes gradually as the result of the accumulation of
numerous decisions. The latter is hard to detect, and can cast
doubt on datasets of past cases15.
• Bias. As suggested above, some machine learning projects
have identified biases in the set of past decisions. A predic-
tion system based on such data will inevitably embody some
prejudices. But enshrining such prejudices, however much it
may improve prediction, is not desirable: we should be trying
to eliminate these biases, not to perpetuate them.
It is tempting to look to machine learning for answers to the
problems arising from the impossibility of devising the ontologies
needed to support reasoning by analogy in novel cases. After all
sub-symbolic techniques have succeeded in areas such as computer
vision [34] when symbolic techniques failed. The above consider-
ations, however, suggest that there are also problems - especially
when trying to predict novel, “hard” cases - with machine learn-
ing approaches. We must be equally careful about the problems we
address with these techniques and the claims we make for them.
10 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As noted in the review of previous approaches, precedential reason-
ing as rule application has become standard in AI and Law: since
[40] showed how to reconstruct CATO using rules, rules have of-
fered a way to encapsulate such reasoning formally, and in a fashion
more amenable to computation. However, revisiting the topic in the
light of Stevens’ paper [49] we can see that a vital role remains for
analogy. In Gardner’s easy cases Stevens suggests that either rule ap-
plication or analogy can be used. She does, however, argue that there
is a role for analogy, especially where judicial discretion can or must
be exercised, which involves interpretation of the new case in the
light of precedents and possibly also reinterpreation of precedents in
the light of the new case. Our discussion supports this view and we
suggest that in Gardner’s hard cases, those for which “the rules run
out”, it is essential. But as we have seen from the above discussion,
the analogy in these cases is not between sets of factors, but between
particular elements of the cases. In Dillon, the analogy is between
the people who suffered trauma; in Carney it is between a motor
home and a sedan, or the rear compartment of a motor home and
a footlocker, and in Popov v Hayashi [10] it is between a baseball
and a fox. This means that defining the relevant aspects in advance,
essential for reasoning in the style of HYPO, CATO and subsequent
approaches based upon them [14], is not always possible: comparing
objects requires a great deal more world knowledge than comparing
cases described as a set of factors (or dimensions). The analogy is
not between sets of factors, but between the real world facts (which
may themselves be described in a variety of ways) which determine
whether or not a factor is present. Moreover, in these hard cases,
the relevant facts may not have been considered in any precedent:
Carney was the first motor home to be considered.
To satisfactorily reason with hard cases it would be necessary
to model argumentation with analogy in such a way that it can
handle these comparisons. It would seem that any such reasoning
would need to be based on an extensive ontology, covering not
only legal cases, as in [53], but also the actors and objects in these
15This criticism perhaps does not apply to [33] which was concerned with the behaviour
of the justices rather than what the law should be. As such, its subject is human nature,
which is less changeable than the law.
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cases. But even if we ignore theoretical objections relating to task-
orientation, such as subjectivity and the impossibility of choosing
between alternative ontologies before a case is decided, the sheer
scale of the required ontology makes it an infeasible task. While
it may be possible to construct an ontology for selected past cases
(perhaps supported by Natural Language Processing and Machine
Learning techniques) which would be useful for reconstructing the
argumentation, or for training law students in how to use and critique
analogies, such an ontology would not necessarily be able to support
such reasoning in new cases. It therefore appears that providing
arguments for cases where the rules run out, whether to define the
“switching point”, to decide whether an aspect is Boolean or has
magnitude, or to determine which aspects are present in a case, must
remain the province of human lawyers.
Developers of AI and Law systems have long seen their role as
supporting lawyers and judges rather than replacing them. Even back
in 1976, in [25], a paper which was fairly bullish on the prospects
of computer judges, it was noted that Thorne McCarty, a founding
father of AI and Law, had reservations about the ability of a program
to “capture many of the significant [aspects] of legal reasoning”. By
the mid-eighties the consensus was very much that “Computers can-
not replace the lawyer, but computers can aid the legal profession in
several useful ways.” [28]. Although the notion of replacing lawyers
does resurface from time to time, especially in popular media16, the
discussion in this paper identifies some important facets of legal
reasoning which are not amenable to computer techniques, and are
likely to remain so.
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